Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

*BEST COPY*

*AVAILABLE*

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

14 OCTOBER 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MOSCOW RADIO PROPAGANDA TO AND ABOUT THE ARAB WORLD

(April - September 1952)

Document No. 45
No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S
Next Review Date: 1989
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: 8 JUN 1979 By: 31322

25X1A8a

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. Soviet Broadcasts to the Arab World

1. Arabic-language commentaries comprise but a small portion of Moscow radio's total output. During the past three months the portion is slightly more than one percent.

2. Soviet broadcasts to the Arab world do not give primary attention to discussions of that area. For example, the USSR is discussed two and one-half times as much as Arab affairs. This emphasis on the Soviet Union is typical of all beams.

3. Moscow's major propaganda themes and campaigns are heard in all languages so Arab listeners in general hear much the same thing as do other audiences. The difference is a matter of degree. (In the period since July peace-campaign material comprised 13 percent of the total Arabic-language output, charges of western aggressiveness 5 percent, bacterial warfare charges 5 percent and claims of imperialist intervention 5 percent.)

II. Soviet Broadcasts About the Arab World

1. Radio Moscow's discussion of the Arab states, as opposed to broadcasts beamed to that area, is extremely low level. During the six months beginning 1 April 1952, discussion of the Arab world comprised only 5 percent of Moscow's total comment.

2. Comment on the Arab world avoids specific internal affairs and developments and dwells rather on broad general themes. During the six-month period almost half of the comment dealt with charges of Western aggression and claims of success for the peace campaign in the region.

3. Similarly, there is little discussion of individual Arab states, e.g. there was but a single commentary devoted to Iraq in the past three months. The area as a whole is discussed.

4. The major themes in propaganda about the area are Anglo-American intervention and/or aggression with Anglo-American rivalry, contradictions and disunity juxtaposed with these charges.

5. The Soviet position vis-a-vis the Arabs is only rarely discussed. For the most part Moscow maintains the pose of a neutral and objective observer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2
SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

## INTRODUCTION

This paper surveys Moscow radio broadcasts in Arabic as well as the total broadcasts about the Arab states. An attempt has been made to determine the major areas, themes, topics and events discussed in Arabic-language broadcasts and in broadcasts concerning the Arab states. Only commentaries have been analyzed and the commentary is the unit of quantitative measurement. The commentary--as opposed to news, feature programs, or educational and cultural items--is defined to include speeches, talks, diplomatic notes and exchanges of messages, and articles taken from the press.

Regarding the study of Arabic-language commentaries, the period given primary attention is from 1 July to the end of September 1952 and the figures used apply to this period. In regard to Soviet radio propaganda about the Arab states, the survey period commences 1 April 1952 and runs through September.

## I. Arabic-Language Broadcasts

Only a small portion of Moscow's entire broadcast output is in Arabic--approximately 10 hours a week--and a relatively small portion of this 10 hours is devoted to commentaries. During the third quarter of 1952--beginning with 1 July--the total number of Arabic-language commentaries was 213, or an average of 16 per week.* The total number of commentaries in all languages during this period was 18,548. Compared with the number of Arabic items there were 799 Persian, 861 in the Soviet Home Service, 1,433 German and 1,980 in English to North America.

Substantively, broadcasts to the Arabs contain largely the same topics, themes and events as broadcasts to other countries. For example, the country discussed most is the USSR; during the third quarter approximately 38 percent of Arabic-language commentaries were concerned with the Soviet Union.** On the other hand, only about 15 percent of the commentaries to the Arab world were about the Arab world. Discussion of Asian countries exceeds this slightly with Korea alone making up almost 7 percent of total Arabic commentaries.

---

* This figure is somewhat lower than previous quarters partly because of poor reception conditions.

** Area codes are determined by the locus of action, not by the actor. Commentaries coded USSR deal with happenings in the USSR, not with the Soviet Union activity. For example, an item on delivery of grain to India would be coded India.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2
SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-3

The following table shows attention to various areas in absolute numbers and percents.

| Area | Total Arabic Commentaries | Percent of Total Arabic |
|---|---|---|
| USSR | 81 | 38% |
| Globe* | 36 | 17 |
| Arab States (total) | 32 | 15 |
| Iraq | 3 | 1 |
| Egypt | 2 | .9 |
| Syria | 1 | .5 |
| Lebanon | 1 | .5 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1 | .5 |
| French N. Africa | 1 | .5 |
| Tunisia | 1 | .5 |
| Morocco | 1 | .5 |
| Area as whole | 21 | 9 |
| Asia | 34 | 16 |
| Korea | 14 | 7 |
| China | 11 | 5 |
| Japan | 2 | .9 |
| India | 2 | .9 |
| Ceylon | 1 | .5 |
| Vietnam | 1 | .5 |
| General | 3 | 1 |
| Satellites | 13 | 6 |
| Rumania | 5 | 2 |
| Hungary | 3 | 1 |
| Bulgaria | 2 | .9 |
| Poland | 1 | .5 |
| Albania | 1 | .5 |
| General | 1 | .5 |
| Germany | 8 | 4 |
| United States | 3 | 1 |

While the United States is condemned for its alleged intervention and aggressive plans, there is little discussion of the United States as a locus of action. Similarly, during this period there was a complete avoidance of internal affairs in Greece and Turkey.

Substance of Arabic Aggression Broadcasts: During the three months under review, 15 percent of commentaries in the Arab beam were devoted to the peace campaign, 5 percent to general charges of Western aggressive preparations, 5 percent to allegations of imperialist intervention or interference in the affairs of other states, and 5 percent to bacterial warfare charges. Aggression charges in all beams for this period

* This code is used for general discussions related to both the Soviet and non-Soviet world and which do not single out a particular area.

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2
SECRET



comprised 5 percent of Moscow's total commentary output. Therefore, Arab listeners were hearing the average amount of aggression charges. Discussion of peace activities during this period, however, was slightly overemphasized in the Arab beam. Over-all peace-campaign material comprised 7 percent of Moscow's total output, while 15 percent of the material the Arabs heard dealt with peace matters. Charges of imperialist, and particularly United States, intervention were occasionally linked to Point Four aid. (However, references to Point Four were quantitatively small at the commentary level--30 items in all beams for the past six months.)

Events discussed in Arabic-language commentaries during the period under study included the visit of Chou En-lai to the Soviet Union (4 items), the V-J anniversary (2 items), and the Soviet note regarding Germany (2 items). Any widely exploited event or topic is normally broadcast in all beams. Therefore, Arab listeners hear much the same material that other audiences hear.

## II. Broadcasts About the Arab World

Moscow's comment on the Arab states is extremely low level and amounted to 230 commentaries during the past six months. During the third quarter of 1952 the total was 97 commentaries as compared with the above-cited total figure of 18,548 commentaries on all subjects. Total comment about the Arab states for the April to July period was somewhat higher, 133 items. However, the only significant exception to this generally low level occurred in the fall of 1951 when rebroadcasts of the Soviet notes--protesting the formation of a Middle East Command--which were sent to the Arab states and to the three Western powers and Turkey boosted attention to an unprecedented 140 items in one week. The second Soviet note to the Arab states at the end of last January brought comment to 65 items in a single week. Apart from these isolated instances, attention remains at a low level.

Over half of the discussion deals with the region as a whole rather than with individual countries. In the six months since last April Egypt was the subject of only 21 items; and Egypt, with the single exception of Tunisia with 52 items, was the Arab country receiving the most attention. The emphasis on Tunisia was a reflection of U.N. developments. During the same period Iraq was discussed in only 6 items, Lebanon 5, the Sudan 3, Syria 2, and Transjordan 2.

Beaming and Substance of Broadcasts About Arab World: During the past six months 32 percent of the comment about the Arab world was broadcast in Arabic. Other audiences received the following percentage of attention: Persian, 22%; Turkish, 12%; Soviet, 10%; and combined Asian audiences, 10%. Greek listeners, on the other hand, heard less than 3% of the total (6 items).

This concentration is generally characteristic of Soviet broadcasting for 40% of comment on France, 43% of comment on Britain and 33% of



Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2
SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2



comment on Italy are broadcast in French, English and Italian respectively.

Moscow's propaganda about the Arab states seems concerned with discrediting the Western powers and preventing the inclusion of the Arab world in the Western camp. Thus, in the typical six-month survey period over one-third of the broadcasts about the Arab states dealt with Western aggressive plans, and a half of these aggression charges were directly related to a Middle East Command. Claims of imperialist (again particularly American) intervention and exploitation outside the aggression context are also emphasized. Arab leaders and officials are almost never the object of personal attack; "ruling circles" are denounced as the lackeys of the imperialists but are not targets for individualized attack. Broadcasts consistently appeal to Arab nationalism by emphasizing the imperialist infringement-of-sovereignty theme. On the other hand Soviet-Arab relations are rarely discussed. There have been infrequent declarations of Soviet support and friendship of the Arabs, but this theme is definitely soft-pedaled in radio propaganda. However, discussions of the peace campaign indirectly place the Soviets and the Arabs in the same camp, and during the six-month period peace activities in the region comprised 13 percent of total attention to Arab affairs.

Moscow's Treatment of Middle East Command: As noted above, Soviet radio propagandists' peak attention to the Arab states occurred at the time of the Soviet notes on MEC. Since April MEC has been a steady though much smaller component of Moscow comment. The line in general is that the Arabs do not want and feel no need for a "defense" pact, that it is being forced upon them by the Anglo-Americans. Rarely, however, is there any explicit charge that MEC would be a threat to the Soviet Union. (An exception to this occurred in the text of the January note.) Neither are there explicit Soviet claims that a defensive pact is obviated by Soviet peaceableness. Therefore, the emphasis is not on the threatening nature of the pact but rather on the naturally aggressive nature of the Anglo-Americans, their infringements of sovereignty, and their exploitation of the Arab states. Appeals to nationalism are a steady component of the propaganda on MEC. For example an IZVESTIA article, broadcast in May, claimed that the MEC proposal was strenuously opposed by Egypt which was not asked to join but was merely expected to allow her soil to be used as headquarters for the command. Consistent with the failure to emphasize the threatening nature of the pact is the emphasis on Anglo-American contradictions and differences. For instance the alleged quarrel over headquarters and a commander for the organization is constantly cited. Thus a commentary in late July declared that the differences were growing, that while the United States demanded an American supreme commander and, along with Turkey, insisted on headquarters in Alexandretta, Britain wanted the headquarters on Cyprus or Malta and demanded a British commander.



Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2



The Arabs are constantly warned not to be taken in by so-called different plans for a defense pact. In June Moscow asserted that the London conference of British diplomatic representatives in the Middle East would draft a "so-called new proposal" on an MEC. Similarly, in late September the Arabs were warned not to be fooled by the new U.S. subterfuge, namely the claim that it has produced a new plan for the establishment of an organization to supervise the defense of the Middle East.

Moscow also pursued its standard propaganda practice of differentiating between people and governments in MEC comment. In early July an item taken from DER ABEND declared that Ambassador Caffery had recommended that Britain offer Egypt an equal and independent status in MEC and gradual evacuation of British troops from the Canal zone. It was his view, claimed Moscow, that Egypt was ready to take part in MEC but needed concessions to justify the policy before Egyptian public opinion.

The "Greater Turkey" Theme: Closely linked with charges that a Middle East Command is being formed are the claims that Turkey has designs on her Arab neighbors and has hopes of reviving the Ottoman Empire.* During the past six months this theme has been low quantitatively—only 5 commentaries—and at present there seems no concerted effort to stir up enmity toward the Turks. (However, in other contexts Turkey is linked with the Anglo-Americans and is described as an historical enemy.) Variations of the "Greater Turkey" theme occurred in late April when Arabic listeners were warned that "an Ankara-Amman axis began to materialize particularly after the warm reception given to the late King Abdullah when he visited Ankara. Turkish ruling quarters persistently try to achieve close cooperation with Israel** which shares Turkey's fate in being a bridgehead of imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean."

Events Exploited—Fechteler Report: In support of their allegations of Western aggressiveness and intervention, Soviet propagandists used such events as the LE MONDE account of Admiral Fechteler's alleged report to the National Security Council, Spanish Foreign Minister Artajo's visit to the Middle East, and the trip of Assistant Secretary of State Byroade. Regarding Fechteler, broadcasts emphasized the allegation that the Middle East would be used as a bridgehead in the next war and that the war would be won by those possessing Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles.

Foreign Minister Artajo's visit was directly linked with MEC and he was said to serve American aims in the area. Secretary Byroade was variously described as a spy and/or a war instigator.

Avoidance of Internal Affairs: As pointed out above Moscow devotes little attention to internal Arab affairs. Egypt is a case in point;

25X1A6c

* See report [redacted] for a discussion of Moscow's use of this theme.

** Commentaries on Israel are extremely rare and the country's internal affairs are almost never discussed.



Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2


there were only 21 items in six months and not many of these were on internal developments. For example the July coup, Ali Maher's appointment as premier and Farouk's abdication were reported promptly in TASS dispatches but received no mention in Arabic-language broadcasts until 10 August. The few commentaries discussed the coup in terms of Anglo-American contradictions. News items immediately quoted European press comment as observing that Ali Maher came to power after appropriate consultations with American diplomats. A later article broadcast in English to the United Kingdom but not in Arabic said that immediately after the coup General Nagib made contact with the American Embassy—that even before Farouk's abdication Ambassador Caffery had discussions with Ali Maher on "the peaceful liquidation of Farouk's reign." Since the ouster of Ali Maher and General Nagib's taking over there has been a general avoidance of Egyptian affairs.

The following list indicates Moscow's relative avoidance of internal developments.

1. Dismissal of Chenik government. A PRAVDA article, broadcast in French and to the Soviet home audience, reported De Hauteclocque's "path of violence" and the arrest of Premier Chenik. There was no subsequent comment.

2. Sudanese draft constitution. A single item broadcast in Arabic said it was a device to enable the British to consolidate their imperialist regime.

3. Postponement of the Egyptian elections was briefly discussed in a broadcast in the Soviet Home Service only.

The following events and topics were completely avoided in commentaries.

1. March. Arab League meeting.
   Ratification by several member states of the Collective Security Pact of 1950.

2. April. Bombing of the USIE office in Damascus.
   Security Council discussion of placing Tunisian question on agenda.
   Suppression of political parties in Syria.
   Secretary General of the Central Committee of Transjordan CP, Fuad Nassar. TASS reported that "Fuad Nassar who was sentenced to 10 years forced labor in February has been kept in chains.... Nassar has a weak heart and his life is in danger." (The trial in February was completely ignored. This is in keeping with Moscow's general avoidance of Communists in the Arab world. The persecution-of-progressives theme is not exploited in the Arab context. In contrast, Moscow comment on


Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2



Greece consistently plays up this theme. The Greek Communist trials last winter and the execution of Belayannis and others were widely exploited.)

3. June. Transjordan. The appointment of a Regency Council to relieve Talal was described in a news item as a conspiracy plotted by the British who wished to remove Talal because of his pro-United States tendencies. This line—Anglo-American rivalry for control of various governments—is a consistent one. It was used at the time of Talal's assumption of power and the various Syrian coups previously were attributed to Anglo-American differences.

4. July. Hilali Pasha's resignation (reported by TASS only).

5. Sept. General Naguib's formation of a government.
Lebanese cabinet resignation.
Arab League Council meeting and replacement of Secretary General.
Resignation of Lebanese president. (Reported in news items.)

6. Oct. Naguib-Nahas clash.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP78-03097A000500030086-2